

# TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

2021/22

March 2021

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## Section 1: CURRENT TREASURY POSITION

### Current Portfolio Position

1.1 The overall treasury management portfolio at 31 March 2020 and the position at 31 December 2020 is shown below for both borrowing and investments.

<b>Table 1: NET TREASURY INVESTMENTS</b>	<b>Actual 31/03/2020 £000</b>	<b>Current 31/12/2020 £000</b>
<b>Treasury Investments</b>		
Cash at Bank	4,002	14,662
Building Societies - unrated	18,000	13,000
Building Societies - rated	0	0
Local Authorities	0	0
DMADF (HM. Treasury)	0	0
Money Market Funds	25,022	35,000
Certificates of Deposit		0
<b>Total Managed In-House</b>	<b>47,024</b>	<b>62,662</b>
Bond Funds	0	0
Property Funds	0	0
<b>Total Managed Externally</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total Treasury Investments</b>	<b>47,024</b>	<b>62,662</b>
<b>Treasury External Borrowing</b>		
Local Authorities	14,000	9,000
PWLB	0	0
<b>Total External Borrowing</b>	<b>14,000</b>	<b>9,000</b>
<b>Net Treasury Investments / (Borrowing)</b>	<b>33,024</b>	<b>53,662</b>

### Expected Investment Balances

1.2 The application of resources (capital receipts, reserves etc.) to either finance capital expenditure or other budget decisions to support the revenue budget will have an ongoing impact on investments unless resources are supplemented each year from new sources (asset sales etc.). Detailed below are estimates of the year-end balances for each resource and anticipated day-to-day cash flow balances.

<b>Table 2: EXPECTED BALANCES TO INVEST OR FUND CAPITAL</b>	<b>2019/20 Actual £000</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £000</b>
General Fund Balance	7,939	3,246	3,246	3,246	3,246

<b>Table 2: EXPECTED BALANCES TO INVEST OR FUND CAPITAL</b>	<b>2019/20</b>	<b>2020/21</b>	<b>2021/22</b>	<b>2022/23</b>	<b>2023/24</b>
	<b>Actual £000</b>	<b>Estimate £000</b>	<b>Estimate £000</b>	<b>Estimate £000</b>	<b>Estimate £000</b>
Earmarked Reserves	33,652	24,509	17,509	17,509	17,509
Capital Receipts/Grants	24,503	15,698	15,698	15,698	15,698
Provisions	181	181	181	181	181
Revenue Grants					
<b>Total Core funds - General Fund</b>	<b>66,275</b>	<b>43,634</b>	<b>36,634</b>	<b>36,634</b>	<b>36,634</b>
Working Capital *	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000
Under / Over Borrowing **	16,924	16,924	16,924	16,924	16,924
<b>Expected Investments</b>	<b>42,351</b>	<b>19,710</b>	<b>12,710</b>	<b>12,710</b>	<b>12,710</b>

\*Working capital balances shown are estimated year-end; these may be higher mid-year

\*\* This table has been prepared on the basis that the current level of under borrowing is sustained across the period.

## Section 2: Prudential and Treasury Indicators 2021/22 – 2023/24

2.1 The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity and these have been shown in the main document. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

### Key Prudential Indicators

2.2 The two key prudential indicators are explained and presented in the main report and included here for completeness:

<b>Table 3: PLANNED CAPITAL EXPENDITURE TO BE FINANCED</b>	<b>2019/20 Actual £000</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £000</b>
People Services	1,595	17,163	11,575	11,525	1,525
Place Services	4,923	24,048	26,939	16,249	1,557
Organisation Services	1,385	4,890	2,767	2,293	2,019
Corporate Investment and Regeneration Activities	0	50,000	0	0	0
Loans to Wholly Owned Companies	10,219	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>18,122</b>	<b>96,100</b>	<b>41,280</b>	<b>30,067</b>	<b>5,101</b>

<b>Table 4: FINANCING OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE</b>	<b>2019/20 Actual £000</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £000</b>
Grants/Contributions	2,513	1,843	1,600	1,187	1,187
Capital Receipts	2,099	8,805	24,488	26,778	0
Revenue	759	0	0	0	0
Reserves	304	10,000	7,000	0	0
<b>External Funding</b>	<b>5,675</b>	<b>20,649</b>	<b>33,089</b>	<b>27,965</b>	<b>1,187</b>
Net borrowing need - General Fund (Core)	2,228	25,451	8,192	2,101	3,913
Net borrowing need - General Fund (Regeneration)	10,219	50,000	0	0	0
<b>Net financing need for the year</b>	<b>12,447</b>	<b>75,451</b>	<b>8,192</b>	<b>2,101</b>	<b>3,913</b>

## Affordability prudential indicators

### Ratio of financing costs to Net Revenue Budget

2.3 The Medium Term Financial Plan has already been adopted and within it the Chief Finance Officer has highlighted that there are funding gaps in future years. The investment in corporate initiatives and regeneration is intended to make up part of that gap.

2.4 The table below highlights the risk to the net budget requirement of not achieving any planned income streams – the top line represents the increasing percentage of net budget requirement which would be needed to service debt if none of the existing investment income were received. The lower line represents the percentage of net budget requirement which would be needed to service debt even if existing investment income streams deliver as currently planned.

<b>Table 5: RATIO OF FINANCING COSTS TO NET REVENUE BUDGET</b>	<b>2019/20</b>	<b>2020/21</b>	<b>2021/22</b>	<b>2022/23</b>	<b>2023/24</b>
	<b>Actual %</b>	<b>Estimate %</b>	<b>Estimate %</b>	<b>Estimate %</b>	<b>Estimate %</b>
Gross cost of borrowing as % of net budget requirement	1.8%	1.8%	8.7%	15.5%	16.5%
Net cost of borrowing including investment income as % of net budget requirement	(3.9)%	(3.9)%	1.7%	9.7%	10.6%

2.5 The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report.

<b>Table 6: EXTERNAL DEBT FOR COMMERCIAL AND REGENERATION ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>2019/20</b>	<b>2020/21</b>	<b>2021/22</b>	<b>2022/23</b>	<b>2023/24</b>
	<b>Actual %</b>	<b>Estimate %</b>	<b>Estimate %</b>	<b>Estimate %</b>	<b>Estimate %</b>
<b>External Debt for corporate investment / regeneration activities</b>					
Actual debt at 31 March - £m	10,219	60,219	60,219	60,219	60,219
Percentage of total external debt - %	72%	67%	63%	63%	62%

### Maturity structure of borrowing

- 2.6 These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.
- 2.7 The Council is relatively new to borrowing and has a very limited portfolio at present therefore in order to maximise the opportunity to achieve good value for money and in the absence of any currently maturing loans, the Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

<b>Table 7: MATURITY STRUCTURE OF BORROWING 2021/22</b>		
	<b>Lower</b>	<b>Upper</b>
Under 12 months	0%	100%
12 months to 2 years	0%	100%
2 years to 5 years	0%	100%
5 years to 10 years	0%	100%
10 years to 20 years	0%	100%
20 years to 30 years	0%	100%
30 years to 40 years	0%	100%
40 years to 50 years	0%	100%

### External Debt

- 2.8 The Council's forward projections for borrowing are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt, against the underlying capital borrowing need, (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.
- 2.9 The introduction of IFRS16 may change some of the Prudential Indicators due to additional lease liabilities being recognised on the balance sheet under the heading 'Other Long Term Liabilities'. In preparation for the potential adoption of the new standard in 2022/23, the capital financing requirement now includes the cost of operating leases. Once these have been reviewed, revised indicators will be provided to Members at the earliest opportunity.

<b>Table 8: EXPECTED CHANGE IN EXTERNAL DEBT</b>	<b>2019/20 Actual £000</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £000</b>
<b>External Debt</b>					
Debt at 1 April	12,000	14,000	89,130	95,961	95,829
Expected change in Debt	2,000	75,130	6,831	-132	1,560
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL)	181	181	181	181	181
Expected change in OLTL	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Actual Gross Debt at 31 March</b>	<b>14,181</b>	<b>89,311</b>	<b>96,142</b>	<b>96,010</b>	<b>97,570</b>

<b>Table 8: EXPECTED CHANGE IN EXTERNAL DEBT</b>	<b>2019/20 Actual £000</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £000</b>
CFR	31,105	106,235	113,066	112,934	114,494
<b>Under / (over) Borrowing</b>	<b>16,924</b>	<b>16,924</b>	<b>16,924</b>	<b>16,924</b>	<b>16,924</b>

### Treasury Indicators: Limit To Borrowing Activity

2.10 Within the range of prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well-defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2021/22 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue or speculative purposes.

2.11 The Chief Finance Officer reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report.

2.12 **The Operational Boundary** Is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt and the ability to fund under-borrowing by other cash resources.

<b>Table 9: OPERATIONAL BOUNDARY FOR BORROWING (MAX EXPECTED)</b>	<b>2019/20 Actual £000</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £000</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £000</b>
Borrowing - General	20,000	35,735	42,566	42,434	43,994
Borrowing – Corporate Investment and Regeneration	50,000	70,000	70,000	70,000	70,000
Other long term liabilities		500	500	500	500
<b>Total</b>	<b>70,000</b>	<b>106,235</b>	<b>113,066</b>	<b>112,934</b>	<b>114,494</b>

2.13 **The authorised limit for external debt** is a key prudential indicator and represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a legal limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt

which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

2.14 This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised. The Council is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

<b>Table 10: AUTHORISED LIMITS FOR BORROWING</b>	<b>2019/20</b>	<b>2020/21</b>	<b>2021/22</b>	<b>2022/23</b>	<b>2023/24</b>
	<b>Actual £000</b>	<b>Estimate £000</b>	<b>Estimate £000</b>	<b>Estimate £000</b>	<b>Estimate £000</b>
Borrowing - General	30,000	45,735	52,566	52,434	53,994
Borrowing – Corporate Investment and Regeneration	50,000	70,000	70,000	70,000	70,000
Other long term liabilities		500	500	500	500
<b>Total</b>	<b>80,000</b>	<b>116,235</b>	<b>123,066</b>	<b>122,934</b>	<b>124,494</b>

### **Investment returns expectations**

2.15 Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- Q1 2021 0.10%
- Q1 2022 0.10%
- Q1 2023 0.10%

The budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows:

2020/21	0.75%
2021/22	0.94%
2022/23	0.10%
2023/24	0.10%
2024/25	0.10%

2.16 The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably relatively even due to the weight of all the uncertainties over post-Brexit trade arrangements and the impact of an expansionary government spending policy (as expected in the Budget on 11th March).

## Investment returns expectations

2.17 These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

<b>Table 11: UPPER LIMIT FOR PRINCIPAL SUMS &gt;365 DAYS £m</b>	<b>2021/22</b>	<b>2022/23</b>	<b>2023/24</b>
Principal sums invested for longer than 365 days	£20m	£20m	£20m
Current investments as at 31.12.20 in excess of 1 year maturing in each year	£13m-	-	-

2.18 For its cash flow-generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise business reserve, instant access and notice accounts, pooled investments (such as money market funds) and short-dated deposits (overnight to 100 days), in order to benefit from the compounding of interest.

## Investment risk benchmarking

2.19 The Council will use the 7-Day LIBID rate as an investment benchmark to assess the performance of its investment portfolio.

## End of year investment report

2.20 At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

## Creditworthiness.

As advised by LINK: *“the credit rating agencies changed their outlook on many UK banks from Stable to Negative during the quarter ended 30.6.20 due to upcoming risks to banks’ earnings and asset quality during the economic downturn caused by the pandemic, the majority of ratings were affirmed due to the continuing strong credit profiles of major financial institutions, including UK banks. However, during Q1 and Q2 2020, banks made provisions for expected credit losses and the rating changes reflected these provisions. As we move into future quarters, more information will emerge on actual levels of credit losses. (Quarterly earnings reports are normally announced in the second half of the month following the end of the quarter.) This has the potential to cause rating agencies to revisit their initial rating adjustments earlier in the current year. These adjustments could be negative or positive, although it should also be borne in mind that banks went into this pandemic with strong balance sheets. This is predominantly a result of regulatory changes imposed on banks following the Great Financial Crisis. Indeed, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) report on 6<sup>th</sup> August revised down their expected credit losses for the UK banking sector to “somewhat less than £80bn”. It stated that in its assessment, “banks have buffers of capital more than sufficient to absorb the losses that are likely to arise under the MPC’s central projection”. The FPC stated that for real stress in the sector, the economic output would need to be twice as bad as the MPC’s projection, with unemployment rising to above 15%.*

*All three rating agencies have reviewed banks around the world with similar results in many countries of most banks being placed on Negative Outlook, but with a small number of actual downgrades.”*

### **Certificates of Deposit (CDS) prices**

2.21 As advised by LINK: *“Although bank CDS prices, (these are market indicators of credit risk), spiked upwards at the end of March / early April 2020 due to the heightened market uncertainty and ensuing liquidity crisis that affected financial markets, they have returned to more average levels since then. Nevertheless, prices are still elevated compared to end-February 2020. Pricing is likely to remain volatile as uncertainty continues. However, sentiment can easily shift, so it will remain important to undertake continual monitoring of all aspects of risk and return in the current circumstances. Link monitor CDS prices as part of their creditworthiness service to local authorities and the Council has access to this information via its Link-provided Passport portal.”*

### **Other limits**

2.22 Due care will be taken to consider the exposure of the Council’s total investment portfolio to non-specified investments, countries, groups and sectors.

### **Non-specified treasury management investment limit**

2.23 The Council has determined that it will limit the maximum total exposure of treasury management investments to non-specified treasury management investments as being 20% of the total treasury management investment portfolio.

### **Country limit.**

2.24 The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from the UK and from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch (or equivalent). The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 1, Section 5. This list will be added to, or deducted from, by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

### **Other limits.**

2.25 In addition:

- no more than £10M will be placed with any non-UK country at any time;
- limits in place above will apply to a group of companies;

- sector limits will be monitored regularly for appropriateness.

### Section 3 Economic Background from LINK Advisory

UK.

The Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) kept **Bank Rate** and quantitative easing (QE) unchanged on 4<sup>th</sup> February. However, it revised its economic forecasts to take account of a third national lockdown which started on 5<sup>th</sup> January, which is obviously going to delay economic recovery and do further damage to the economy. Moreover, it had already decided in November to undertake a further tranche of quantitative easing (QE) of £150bn, to start in January when the previous programme of £300bn of QE, announced in March to June 2020, finished. As only about £16bn of the latest £150bn tranche had been used towards the end of January, it felt that there was already sufficient provision for QE - which would be made to last to the end of 2021. This implied that the current rate of purchases of £4.4bn per week would be slowed during the year.

Although its short-term forecasts were cut for 2021, the medium-term forecasts were more optimistic than in November, based on an assumption that the current lockdown will be gradually eased after Q1 as vaccines are gradually rolled out and life can then start to go back to some sort of normality. The Bank's main assumptions were:

- The economy would start to **recover strongly** from Q3 2021.
- **£125bn of savings** made by consumers during the pandemic will give a significant boost to the pace of economic recovery once lockdown restrictions are eased and consumers can resume high street shopping, going to pubs and restaurants and taking holidays.
- The economy would still recover to reach its **pre-pandemic level** by Q1 2022 despite a long lockdown in Q1 2021.
- **Spare capacity** in the economy would be eliminated in Q1 2022.
- The Bank also expects there to be **excess demand** in the economy by Q4 2022.
- **Unemployment** will peak at around 7.5% during late 2021 and then fall to about 4.2% by the end of 2022. This forecast implies that 0.5m foreign workers will have been lost from the UK workforce by their returning home.
- **CPI inflation** was forecast to rise quite sharply towards the 2% target in Q1 2021 due to some temporary factors, (e.g. the reduction in VAT for certain services comes to an end) and given developments in energy prices. CPI inflation was projected to be close to 2% in 2022 and 2023.
- The Monetary Policy Report acknowledged that there were **downside risks** to their forecasts e.g. from virus mutations, will vaccines be fully effective, how soon can tweaked vaccines be devised and administered to deal with mutations? There are also issues around achieving herd immunity around the world from this virus so that a proliferation of mutations does not occur which prolong the time it takes for the global economy to fully recover.
- The Report also mentioned a potential **upside risk** as an assumption had been made that consumers would only spend £6bn of their savings of £125bn once restrictions were eased. However, the risk is that that consumers could spend a lot more and more quickly.
- The Bank of England also removed **negative interest rates** as a possibility for at least six months as financial institutions were not yet ready to implement them. As in six months' time the economy should be starting to grow strongly, this effectively means that negative rates occurring are only a slim possibility in the current downturn. However, financial institutions have been requested to prepare for them so that, at a future time, this could be used as a monetary policy tool if deemed


appropriate. (**Gilt yields and PWLB rates** jumped upwards after the removal of negative rates as a key risk in the short-term.)

- Prior to 4<sup>th</sup> February, the **MPC's forward guidance** outlined that the sequencing of a withdrawal of monetary policy support would be that Bank Rate would be increased first, and only once it had reached a certain level, 'around 1.5%', before a start would be made on winding down the stock of asset purchases made under QE. However, the MPC decided at the February meeting that this policy should be reviewed as to whether a start should be made first on **winding down QE** rather than raising Bank Rate.
- The MPC reiterated its previous guidance that Bank Rate would not rise until inflation was sustainably above 2%. This means that it will tolerate inflation running above 2% from time to time to balance out periods during which inflation was below 2%. This is termed **average inflation targeting**.
- **There are two views in respect of Bank Rate beyond our three-year time horizon:**
  1. The MPC will be keen to raise Bank Rate as soon as possible in order for it to be a usable tool when the next economic downturn comes along. This is in line with thinking on Bank Rate over the last 20 years.
  2. Conversely, that we need to adjust to the new post-pandemic era that we are now in. In this new era, the shift to average inflation targeting has set a high bar for raising Bank Rate i.e. only when inflation is demonstrably sustainably above 2%. In addition, many governments around the world have been saddled with high levels of debt. When central bank rates are low, and below the average GDP growth rate, the debt to GDP ratio will gradually fall each year without having to use fiscal tools such as raising taxes or austerity programmes, (which would depress economic growth and recovery). This could therefore result in governments revising the setting of mandates to their national central banks to allow a higher rate of inflation linked to other economic targets. This is the Capital Economics view – that Bank Rate will not rise for the next five years and will probably then struggle to get to 1% within 10 years.
- **Public borrowing** was forecast in November 2020 by the Office for Budget Responsibility (the OBR) to reach £394bn in the current financial year, the highest ever peace time deficit and equivalent to 19% of GDP. In normal times, such an increase in total gilt issuance would lead to a rise in gilt yields, and so PWLB rates. However, the QE done by the Bank of England has depressed gilt yields to historic low levels, (as has similarly occurred with QE and debt issued in the US, the EU and Japan). This means that new UK debt being issued, and this is being done across the whole yield curve in all maturities, is locking in those historic low levels through until maturity. In addition, the UK has one of the longest average maturities for its entire debt portfolio, of any country in the world. Overall, this means that the total interest bill paid by the Government is manageable despite the huge increase in the total amount of debt. The OBR was also forecasting that the government will still be running a budget deficit of £102bn (3.9% of GDP) by 2025/26. However, initial impressions are that they have taken a pessimistic view of the impact that vaccines could make in the speed of economic recovery. It is now likely that total borrowing will probably reach around £420bn due to further Government support measures introduced as a result of further restrictions and the third national lockdown.
- Overall, **the pace of recovery** was not expected to be in the form of a rapid V shape, but a more elongated and prolonged one. The initial recovery was sharp after quarter 1 saw growth at -3.0% followed by -18.8% in quarter 2 and then an upswing of +16.0% in quarter 3; this still left the economy 8.6% smaller than in Q4

2019. While the one month second national lockdown that started on 5<sup>th</sup> November caused a further contraction of 5.7% m/m in November, this was much better than had been feared and showed that the economy is adapting to new ways of working. This left the economy 'only' 8.6% below the pre-crisis level. However, a strong recovery from a further contraction during quarter 1 2021 is expected in the second half of 2021 and is likely to mean that the economy recovers to its pre-pandemic level during Q1 2022.

- **Vaccines – the game changer.** The Pfizer announcement on 9<sup>th</sup> November of a successful vaccine has been followed by approval of the Oxford University/AstraZeneca and Moderna vaccines. The Government has set a target to vaccinate 14 million people in the most at risk sectors of the population by 15<sup>th</sup> February; it has made good, and accelerating progress in hitting that target. The aim is also to vaccinate all over 50s by May and all adults by September. This means that the national lockdown starting in early January, could be replaced by regional tiers of lighter restrictions, beginning possibly in Q2. At that point, there would be less reason to fear that hospitals could become overwhelmed any more. Effective vaccines have radically improved the economic outlook so that it may now be possible for GDP to recover to its pre-virus level as early as Q1 2022. These vaccines have enormously boosted confidence that **life could largely return to normal during the second half of 2021**. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for when life returns to normal.
- Provided that both monetary and fiscal policy are kept loose for a few years yet, then it is still possible that **in the second half of this decade**, the economy may be no smaller than it would have been if COVID-19 never happened. The major concern though, is that new mutations of the virus might defeat the current batch of vaccines. However, work is already advanced to produce what may well become annual revaccinations each autumn with updated vaccines. In addition, countries around the world have ramped up vaccine production facilities and vastly improved testing regimes; they are therefore now much better equipped to deal effectively with any new outbreaks of mutations of this virus.


**Chart: Level of real GDP (Q4 2019 = 100)**



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This recovery of growth which eliminates the effects of the pandemic by about the middle of the decade, would have major repercussions for public finances as it would be consistent with the government deficit falling to around 2.5% of GDP without any tax increases. This would be in line with the OBR's most optimistic

forecast in the graph below, rather than their current central scenario which predicts a 4% deficit due to assuming much slower growth. However, Capital Economics forecasts in the graphs above and below, assumed that politicians do not raise taxes or embark on major austerity measures and so, (perverse!), depress economic growth and recovery.



(if unable to print in colour..... the key describing each line in the above graph is in sequential order from top to bottom in parallel with the lines in the graph.)

- There will still be some **painful longer term adjustments** as e.g. office space and travel by planes, trains and buses may not recover to their previous level of use for several years, or possibly ever, even if vaccines are fully successful in overcoming the current virus. There is also likely to be a **reversal of globalisation** as this crisis has exposed how vulnerable long-distance supply chains are. On the other hand, **digital services** are one area that has already seen huge growth.
- **Brexit.** The final agreement of a trade deal on 24.12.20 has eliminated a significant downside risk for the UK economy. The initial agreement only covers trade so there is further work to be done on the services sector where temporary equivalence has been granted in both directions between the UK and EU; that now needs to be formalised on a permanent basis. However, it is evident from problems with trade flows at ports in January and February, that work needs to be done to smooth out the issues and problems that have been created by complex customs paperwork, in order to deal with bottle necks currently being caused.
- **Fiscal policy.** In December, the Chancellor made a series of announcements to provide further support to the economy: -
  - An extension of the COVID-19 loan schemes from the end of January 2021 to the end of March.
  - The furlough scheme was lengthened from the end of March to the end of April.
  - The Budget on 3.3.21 will lay out the “next phase of the plan to tackle the virus and protect jobs”. This does not sound like tax rises are imminent, (which could hold back the speed of economic recovery).
- The **Financial Policy Committee (FPC)** report on 6.8.20 revised down the expected credit losses for the banking sector to “somewhat less than £80bn”. It stated that in its assessment, “banks have buffers of capital more than sufficient to absorb the losses that are likely to arise under the MPC’s central projection”. The FPC stated that for real stress in the sector, the economic output would need to be twice as bad as the MPC’s projection, with unemployment rising to above 15%.

- US.** Following elections for two senate seats in January, the Democrats now have a majority in the House of Representatives and a very slim majority in the Senate based on the vice president's casting vote. As the Democrats will be dependent on gaining the support of moderate Democrat senators, there will be a limit on just how radical they can be with their legislative and financial programmes. The \$900bn fiscal stimulus passed in December will help the economy gain more traction in early 2021. There is a question mark, however, over whether they will be able to get a much bigger \$1.9bn fiscal stimulus through both houses, though a smaller package would stand much more chance of being approved. The rapid roll out of vaccines is well on course to vaccinate nearly the entire population by the end of the summer; this will help to underpin a strong economic recovery in 2021 after the economy wilted during Q4 2020 as more restrictions were imposed to contain the pandemic.
- After Chair Jerome Powell unveiled the **Fed's adoption of a flexible average inflation target** in his Jackson Hole speech in late August 2020, the mid-September meeting of the Fed agreed by a majority to a toned down version of the new inflation target in his speech - that "it would likely be appropriate to maintain the current target range until labour market conditions were judged to be consistent with the Committee's assessments of maximum employment and inflation had risen to 2% and was on track to moderately exceed 2% for some time." This change was aimed to provide more stimulus for economic growth and higher levels of employment and to avoid the danger of getting caught in a deflationary "trap" like Japan. It is to be noted that inflation has actually been under-shooting the 2% target significantly for most of the last decade, (and in 2020), so financial markets took note that higher levels of inflation are likely to be in the pipeline; long-term bond yields duly rose after the meeting. The FOMC's updated economic and rate projections in mid-September showed that under this new regime of average inflation targeting, that officials expected to leave the fed funds rate at near-zero until at least end-2023 and probably for another year or two beyond that. Where the Fed has led in changing its monetary policy to one based on average inflation targeting in response to the damage that this pandemic has done to the economy, there was much expectation that other major central banks would also follow suit.
- Subsequent meetings of the Fed have projected that **inflation** will not get back sustainably to above 2% for some years and so the vast majority of Fed officials expect the Fed funds rate to still be at near-zero until 2024 or later. The key message is that policy will remain unusually accommodative – with near-zero rates and asset purchases continuing for several more years. This is likely to result in keeping Treasury yields lower than might otherwise be expected, although treasury yields have increased somewhat due to financial markets adjusting to expectations of higher rates of inflation.
- EU.** The economy was recovering well from the first lockdowns towards the end of Q2 and during Q3 after a sharp drop in GDP. However, a second wave of the virus has caused a renewed fall back in growth during Q4. The slow roll out of vaccines during Q1 2021 will delay economic recovery. In Q2 of 2020, GDP was 15% below its pre-pandemic level. But in Q3 the economy grew by 12.5% q/q leaving GDP down by "only" 4.4%. That was much better than had been expected earlier in the year. However, growth contracted by another 0.7% in Q4 and is likely to at least stagnate during Q1 of 2021, as a second wave of the virus has seriously affected many countries. The €750bn fiscal support package eventually agreed by the EU after prolonged disagreement between various countries, is unlikely to provide significant support, and quickly enough, to make an appreciable difference in the countries most affected by the first wave.

- With **inflation** expected to be unlikely to get much above 1% over the next two years, **the ECB** has been struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target. It is currently unlikely that it will cut its central rate even further into negative territory from -0.5%, although the ECB has stated that it retains this as a possible tool to use. The ECB's December meeting added a further €500bn to the PEPP scheme, (purchase of government and other bonds), and extended the duration of the programme to March 2022 and re-investing maturities for an additional year until December 2023. Three additional tranches of TLTRO, (cheap loans to banks), were approved, indicating that support will last beyond the impact of the pandemic, implying indirect yield curve control for government bonds for some time ahead. The Bank's forecast for a return to pre-virus activity levels was pushed back to the end of 2021, but stronger growth is projected in 2022. The total PEPP scheme of €1,850bn of QE which started in March 2020 is providing protection to the sovereign bond yields of weaker countries like Italy. There is therefore unlikely to be a euro crisis while the ECB is able to maintain this level of support. However, as in the UK and the US, the advent of highly effective vaccines will be a game changer once the EU can get a comprehensive vaccination scheme up and running, although growth will struggle before later in quarter 2 of 2021.
- **China.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1, economic recovery was strong in the rest of 2020; this has enabled China to recover all of the contraction in Q1. Policy makers have both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that has been particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy has benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors help to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies. However, this was achieved by major central government funding of yet more infrastructure spending. After years of growth having been focused on this same area, any further spending in this area is likely to lead to increasingly weaker economic returns in the longer term. This could, therefore, lead to a further misallocation of resources which will weigh on growth in future years.
- **Japan.** A third round of fiscal stimulus in early December took total fresh fiscal spending this year in response to the virus close to 12% of pre-virus GDP. That's huge by past standards, and one of the largest national fiscal responses. The budget deficit is now likely to reach 16% of GDP this year. Coupled with Japan's relative success in containing the virus without draconian measures so far, and the likelihood of effective vaccines being available in the coming months, the government's latest fiscal effort should help ensure a strong recovery and to get back to pre-virus levels by Q3 2021 – around the same time as the US and much sooner than the Eurozone. However, on the negative side, it has also been struggling - despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus - to get out of a deflation trap for many years and to achieve consistent, significant GDP growth. Moreover, it has not consistently managed to raise inflation up to its target level of 2% and it is making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.
- **World growth.** World growth has been in recession in 2020 and this is likely to continue into the first half of 2021 before recovery in the second half. Inflation is unlikely to be a problem for some years due to the creation of excess production capacity and depressed demand caused by the coronavirus crisis.
- Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing **globalisation** i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has

boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last thirty years, which now accounts for nearly 20% of total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. The Chinese government has targeted achieving major world positions in specific key sectors and products, especially high tech areas and production of rare earth minerals used in high tech products. It is achieving this by massive financial support, (i.e. subsidies), to state owned firms, government directions to other firms, technology theft, restrictions on market access by foreign firms and informal targets for the domestic market share of Chinese producers in the selected sectors. This is regarded as being unfair competition that is putting western firms at an unfair disadvantage or even putting some out of business. It is also regarded with suspicion on the political front as China is an authoritarian country that is not averse to using economic and military power for political advantage. The current trade war between the US and China therefore needs to be seen against that backdrop. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries** from dependence on China to supply products. This is likely to produce a backdrop in the coming years of weak global growth and so weak inflation.

## Summary

**Central banks are, therefore, likely to support growth by maintaining loose monetary policy through keeping rates very low for longer. Governments could also help a quicker recovery by providing more fiscal support for their economies at a time when total debt is affordable due to the very low rates of interest. They will also need to avoid significant increases in taxation or austerity measures that depress demand and the pace of recovery in their economies.**

**If there is a huge surge in investor confidence as a result of successful vaccines which leads to a major switch out of government bonds into equities, which, in turn, causes government debt yields to rise, then there will be pressure on central banks to actively manage debt yields by further QE purchases of government debt; this would help to suppress the rise in debt yields and so keep the total interest bill on greatly expanded government debt portfolios within manageable parameters. It is also the main alternative to a programme of austerity.**

## Interest Rate Forecasts 2020-2024 from LINK Advisory

Link Group Interest Rate View		8.3.21											
	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
5 yr PWLB	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40
10 yr PWLB	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90
25 yr PWLB	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
50 yr PWLB	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30

Additional notes by Link on this forecast table: -

- Please note that we have made a slight change to our interest rate forecasts table above for forecasts for 3, 6 and 12 months. Traditionally, we have used LIBID forecasts, with the rate calculated using market convention of 1/8th (0.125%) taken off the LIBOR figure. Given that all LIBOR rates up to 6m are currently running below 10bps, using that convention would give negative figures as forecasts for those periods. However, the liquidity premium that is still in evidence at the short end of the curve means that the rates actually being achieved by local authority investors are still modestly in positive territory. While there are differences between counterparty offer rates, our analysis would suggest that an average rate of around 10 bps is achievable for 3 months, 10bps for 6 months and 20 bps for 12 months.
- During 2021, Link will be continuing to look at market developments in this area and will monitor these with a view to communicating with clients when full financial market agreement is reached on how to replace LIBOR. This is likely to be an iteration of the overnight SONIA rate and the use of compounded rates and Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates for forecasting purposes.
- We will maintain continuity by providing clients with LIBID investment benchmark rates on the current basis.

The coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March to cut Bank Rate to first 0.25%, and then to 0.10%, it subsequently left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings, including its last meeting on 4<sup>th</sup> February 2021, although some forecasters had suggested that a cut into negative territory could happen. However, at that last meeting, we were informed that financial institutions were not prepared for implementing negative rates. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), therefore, requested that the Prudential Regulation Authority require financial institutions to prepare for such implementation if, at any time in the future, the MPC may wish to use that as a new monetary policy tool. The MPC made it clear that this did not in any way imply that they were about to use this tool in the near future. As shown in the forecast table above, no increase in Bank Rate is expected in the near-term as it is unlikely that inflation will rise sustainably above 2% during this period so as to warrant increasing Bank Rate.

### **Gilt yields / PWLB rates**

There was much speculation during the second half of 2019 that bond markets were in a bubble which was driving bond prices up and yields down to historically very low levels. The context for that was a heightened expectation that the US could have been heading for a recession in 2020. In addition, there were growing expectations of a downturn in world economic growth, especially due to fears around the impact of the trade war between the US and China, together with inflation generally at low levels in most countries and expected to remain subdued. Combined, these conditions were conducive to very low bond yields. While inflation targeting by the major central banks has been successful over the last 30 years in lowering inflation expectations, the real equilibrium rate for central rates has fallen considerably due to the high level of borrowing by consumers. This means that central banks do not need to raise rates as much now to have a major impact on consumer spending, inflation, etc.

The consequence of this has been the gradual lowering of the overall level of interest rates and bond yields in financial markets over the last 30 years. Over the year prior to the coronavirus crisis, this has seen many bond yields up to 10 years turn negative in the Eurozone. In addition, there has, at times, been an inversion of bond yields in the US whereby 10 year yields have fallen below shorter term yields. In the past, this has been a precursor of a recession. The other side of this coin was that bond prices

were elevated as investors would have been expected to be moving out of riskier assets i.e. shares, in anticipation of a downturn in corporate earnings and so selling out of equities.

Gilt yields had, therefore, already been on a generally falling trend up until the coronavirus crisis hit western economies during March 2020. After gilt yields spiked up in March 2020, we have subsequently seen these yields fall sharply to unprecedented lows as investors panicked during March in selling shares in anticipation of impending recessions in western economies, and moved cash into safe haven assets i.e. government bonds. However, major western central banks took rapid action to deal with excessive stress in financial markets during March, and started massive quantitative easing purchases of government bonds: this also acted to put downward pressure on government bond yields at a time when there has been a huge and quick expansion of government expenditure financed by issuing government bonds. Such unprecedented levels of issuance in "normal" times would have caused bond yields to rise sharply. Gilt yields and PWLB rates have been at remarkably low rates so far during 2020/21.

As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates above shows, there is expected to be little upward movement in PWLB rates over the next two years as government bond yields of major countries around the world are expected to rise little during this time in an environment where central bank rates are also expected to remain low for some years; this is the result of a change of inflation targeting policy of central banks to one based on average inflation over a number of years, (see appendix 5.3 for further explanation). From time to time, gilt yields, and therefore PWLB rates, can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis, emerging market developments and sharp changes in investor sentiment, (as shown on 9<sup>th</sup> November 2020 when the first results of a successful COVID-19 vaccine trial were announced). Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.

### **Investment and borrowing rates**

- **Investment returns** are likely to remain exceptionally low during 2021/22 with little increase in the following two years.
- **Borrowing interest rates** fell to historically very low rates as a result of the COVID crisis and the quantitative easing operations of the Bank of England: indeed, gilt yields up to six years were negative during most of the first half of 2020/21; they jumped up after the Monetary Policy Report of 4<sup>th</sup> February 2021. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served local authorities well over the last few years.
- On 25.11.20, the Chancellor announced the conclusion to the review of margins over gilt yields for PWLB rates which had been increased by 100 bps in October 2019. The standard and certainty margins were reduced by 100 bps but a prohibition was introduced to deny access to borrowing from the PWLB for any local authority which had purchase of assets for yield in its three-year capital programme. The new margins over gilt yields are as follows: -
  - **PWLB Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
  - **PWLB Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80 basis points (G+80bps)
  - **PWLB HRA Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
  - **PWLB HRA Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80bps (G+80bps)
  - **Local Infrastructure Rate** is gilt plus 60bps (G+60bps)

- **Borrowing for capital expenditure.** As Link's long-term forecast for Bank Rate is 2.00%, and all PWLB rates are under 2.00%, there is now value in borrowing from the PWLB for all types of capital expenditure for all maturity periods, especially as current rates are near to historic lows. The Council will assess its risk appetite in conjunction with budgetary pressures to reduce total interest costs. Although short-term interest rates are cheapest, longer-term borrowing could also be undertaken for the purpose of certainty, where that is desirable, or for flattening the profile of a heavily unbalanced maturity profile.
- While this authority will not be able to avoid borrowing to finance new capital expenditure, to replace maturing debt and the rundown of reserves, there will be a cost of carry, (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), to any new borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances.

### **The balance of risks to the UK**

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now probably more to the upside but is subject to major uncertainty due to the virus - both domestically and its potential effects worldwide.
- There is relatively little domestic risk of increases or decreases in Bank Rate in the near-term, nor significant changes in shorter-term PWLB rates. The Bank of England has effectively ruled out the use of negative interest rates anytime soon but increases in Bank Rate are likely to be some years away given the underlying economic expectations. However, it is always possible that safe haven flows, due to unexpected domestic developments and those in other major economies, could impact gilt yields, (and so PWLB rates).

### **Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:**

- **Mutations** of the virus render current vaccines ineffective, and tweaked vaccines to combat these mutations are delayed, resulting in further national lockdowns or severe regional restrictions.
- **UK government** takes too much action too quickly to raise taxation or introduce austerity measures that depress demand and the pace of recovery of the economy.
- **UK - Bank of England** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- **UK / EU trade arrangements** – if there was a major impact on trade flows due to complications with customs paperwork or lack of co-operation in sorting out significant issues. A resurgence of the **Eurozone sovereign debt crisis**. The ECB has taken monetary policy action to support the bonds of EU states, with the positive impact most likely for “weaker” countries. In addition, the EU agreed a €750bn fiscal support package. These actions will help shield weaker economic regions for the next two or three years. However, in the case of Italy, the cost of the virus crisis has added to its already huge debt mountain and its slow economic growth will leave it vulnerable to markets returning to taking the view that its level of debt is unsupportable. There remains a sharp divide between northern EU countries favouring low debt to GDP and annual balanced budgets and southern countries who want to see jointly issued Eurobonds to finance economic recovery. This divide could undermine the unity of the EU in time to come.
- Weak capitalisation of some **European banks**, which could be undermined further depending on extent of credit losses resultant of the pandemic.

- **German minority government & general election in 2021.** In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. Angela Merkel has stepped down from being the CDU party leader but she will remain as Chancellor until the general election in 2021. This then leaves a major question mark over who will be the major guiding hand and driver of EU unity when she steps down.
- **Other minority EU governments.** Italy, Spain, Austria, Sweden, Portugal, Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium also have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile.
- **Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary** now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU, and they had threatened to derail the 7 year EU budget until a compromise was thrashed out in late 2020. There has also been a rise in anti-immigration sentiment in Germany and France.
- **Geopolitical risks**, for example in China, Iran or North Korea, but also in Europe and other Middle Eastern countries, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

#### **Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates**

- **UK** - a significant rise in inflationary pressures e.g. caused by a stronger than currently expected recovery in the UK economy after effective vaccines are administered quickly to the UK population, leading to a rapid resumption of normal life and return to full economic activity across all sectors of the economy.
- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a rapid series of increases in Bank Rate to stifle inflation.

## **Section 4: Treasury Management Practice 1 (TMP1) – Credit and Counter Party Risk Management**

- 4.1 The MHCLG issued Investment Guidance in 2018, and this forms the structure of the Council's policy below. These guidelines do not apply to either trust funds or pension funds which operate under a different regulatory regime.
- 4.2 The key intention of the Guidance is to maintain the current requirement for councils to invest prudently, and that priority is given to security and liquidity before yield. In order to facilitate this objective the guidance requires this Council to have regard to the CIPFA publication Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross-Sectoral Guidance Notes. This Council adopted the Code and will apply its principles to all investment activity. In accordance with the Code, the Director of Finance has produced its treasury management practices (TMPs). This part, TMP 1(1), covering investment counterparty policy requires approval each year.

### **Annual investment strategy**

- 4.3 The key requirements of both the Code and the investment guidance are to set an annual investment strategy, as part of its annual treasury strategy for the following year, covering the identification and approval of following:
- The strategy guidelines for choosing and placing investments, particularly non-specified investments.
  - The principles to be used to determine the maximum periods for which funds can be committed.
  - Specified investments that the Council will use. These are high security (i.e. high credit rating, although this is defined by the Council, and no guidelines are given), and high liquidity investments in sterling and with a maturity of no more than a year.
  - Non-specified investments, clarifying the greater risk implications, identifying the general types of investment that may be used and a limit to the overall amount of various categories that can be held at any time.
- 4.4 The main strategy guidelines are contained in the body of the treasury strategy statement.

### **Specified investments**

- 4.5 MHCLG Investment Guidance states that an investment is a specified investment if all of the following apply:
- The investment is denominated in sterling and any payments or repayments in the respect of the investment are payable only in sterling.
  - The investment is not a long term investment. This means that the local authority has contractual right to repayment within 12 months, either because that is the expiry term of the investment or through a nonconditional option.
  - The making of the investment is not defined as capital expenditure by virtue of Regulation 25(1)(d) of the Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (England) Regulations 2003 [as amended].

- The investment is made with a body or in an investment scheme described as high quality or with one of the following bodies:  
The United Kingdom Government;
  - ii. A local authority in England or Wales (as defined in section 23 of the 2003 Act) or a similar body in Scotland or Northern Ireland; or
  - iii. A parish council or community council.
- 4.6 This Council defines high credit quality as counterparties having a minimum credit rating of:
- Short term: F1/A-1/P-1 (which equates to the long term ratings of A/A/A2)
  - Building Societies regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority and has a minimum of a £1billion asset base
  - MMFs rated AAA
- 4.7 The Council will operate to the following limits in relation to specified investments, where:
- Short Term – less than or equal to 12 months
  - Medium Term – More than 12 months and up to and including 3 years
  - Long Term – over 3 years and up to 5 years

Table 11: COUNTERPARTY LIST			Credit Rating & Duration			
			Fitch	Standard & Poor	Moody's	
The Council's own banker for day to day banking transactional purposes.	If the main bank maintains the following criteria	Short-Term	F1	A-1	P-1	• £20M with the bank or counterparties within their group
The Council's own banker for day to day banking transactional purposes.	If the main bank falls below the following criteria, in this case balances will be minimised in both monetary size and time invested.	Short-Term	F1	A-1	P-1	• £7m
UK Banks	Covers UK Retail & Clearing Banks	Short-Term	F1	A-1	P-1	• £10m with any individual counterparty
		Medium-Term	A+	A+	A1	• £10m with any individual counterparty
		Long-Term	AA-	AA-	Aa3	• £10m with any individual counterparty
Non-UK domiciled Banks	Non-UK Banks must be domiciled in a country which has a minimum sovereign Long-Term rating of 'AA-'	Short-Term	F1	A-1	P-1	• £5m with any individual counterparty
						•

Table 11: COUNTERPARTY LIST			Credit Rating & Duration			
			Fitch	Standard & Poor	Moody's	
		Medium - Term	A+	A+	A1	• £10m
		Long-Term	AA-	AA-	Aa3	• £10m
Building societies	The Council will use all societies which meet the following criteria	Regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority <b>and</b> has a minimum of a £1billion asset base				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• £10m with any individual counterparty</li> <li>• Up to and incl. 3 years.</li> </ul>
Money Market Funds (MMFs)	Constant Net Asset Value (CNAV)	Short-Term	AAA	AAA	Aaa	• £10m with any individual counterparty
Money Market Funds (MMFs)	Low-Volatility Net Asset Value (LVNAV)	Short-Term	AAA	AAA	Aaa	• £10m with any individual counterparty
Money Market Funds (MMFs)	Variable Net Asset value (VNAV)	Short-Term	AAA	AAA	Aaa	• £10m with any individual counterparty
UK Government (including gilts, Treasury Bills and the DMADF)	No credit rating - UK Government guarantee	N/A	N/A	N/A		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unlimited</li> <li>• To maturity</li> </ul>
Local authorities, parish councils etc.	No credit rating - UK government guarantee	N/A	N/A	N/A		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• £10m with any individual counterparty</li> <li>• Up to and incl. 5 years</li> </ul>
Supranational institutions (e.g. European Investment Bank or World Bank)	The Council will use supranational institutions which meet the following criteria:	Short-Term	F1	A-1	P-1	• £10m with any individual counterparty

### Non-specified investments

These are any other type of investment (i.e. not defined as specified above) over 365 days or those outside the criteria in Table 11 above where additional due diligence would be required.

### Monitoring of Investment Counterparties

4.8 The credit rating of counterparties will be monitored regularly. The Council receives credit rating information (changes, rating watches and rating outlooks) from LINK as and when ratings change, and counterparties are checked promptly. On occasion ratings may be downgraded when an investment has already been made. The criteria used are such that a minor downgrading should not affect the full receipt of the principal and interest. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria will be removed from the list immediately by the Director of Finance, and if required new counterparties which meet the criteria will be added to the list.



## Section 5 Approved Countries for Investment

5.1 This list is based on those countries which have sovereign ratings of AA- or higher, (we show the lowest rating from Fitch, Moody's and S&P) and also, (except - at the time of writing - for Hong Kong, Norway and Luxembourg), have banks operating in sterling markets which have credit ratings of green or above in the Link credit worthiness service.

### *Based on lowest available rating*

#### AAA

- Australia
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

#### AA+

- Canada
- Finland
- U.S.A.

#### AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France

#### AA-

- Belgium
- Hong Kong
- Qatar
- U.K.

*This list may change during the year*

## **Section 6: Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation**

### **(i) Council**

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities;
- approval of annual strategy.

### **(ii) Executive**

- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices;
- budget consideration and approval;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations;
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.

### **(iii) Overview & Scrutiny Committee**

- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.

## Section 7: Treasury Management Role of the Section 151 Officer

### The Section 151 Officer

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.
- preparation of a capital strategy to include capital expenditure, capital financing, non-financial investments and treasury management, with a long term timeframe
- ensuring that the capital strategy is prudent, sustainable, affordable and prudent in the long term and provides value for money
- ensuring that due diligence has been carried out on all treasury and non-financial investments and is in accordance with the risk appetite of the authority
- ensure that the authority has appropriate legal powers to undertake expenditure on non-financial assets and their financing
- ensuring the proportionality of all investments so that the authority does not undertake a level of investing which exposes the authority to an excessive level of risk compared to its financial resources
- ensuring that an adequate governance process is in place for the approval, monitoring and ongoing risk management of all non-financial investments and long term liabilities
- provision to members of a schedule of all non-treasury investments including material investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures, loans and financial guarantees
- ensuring that members are adequately informed and understand the risk exposures taken on by an authority
- ensuring that the authority has adequate expertise, either in house or externally provided, to carry out the above
- creation of Treasury Management Practices which specifically deal with how non treasury investments will be carried out and managed, to include the following : -
  - *Risk management (TMP1 and schedules), including investment and risk management criteria for any material non-treasury investment portfolios;*

- *Performance measurement and management (TMP2 and schedules), including methodology and criteria for assessing the performance and success of non-treasury investments;*
- *Decision making, governance and organisation (TMP5 and schedules), including a statement of the governance requirements for decision making in relation to non-treasury investments; and arrangements to ensure that appropriate professional due diligence is carried out to support decision making;*
- *Reporting and management information (TMP6 and schedules), including where and how often monitoring reports are taken;*
- *Training and qualifications (TMP10 and schedules), including how the relevant knowledge and skills in relation to non-treasury investments will be arranged.*